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When the European Court of Human Rights
Decides Not to Decide
The Cautionary Tale of A, B & C v. Ireland and
Referendum-Emergent Constitutional Provisions
  *
Public international law takes a very clear position on domestic law: it is
primarily a matter for states, and its provisions do not and cannot excuse
non-compliance with international obligations. There is a whole host
of ways in which tensions between domestic and international legal
obligations emerge, particularly when compliance with international law
requires changes to domestic law. In the European public space, these
difﬁculties are manifest; from Hirst (No. 2)1 in the United Kingdom to
Yukos2 in the Russian Federation, the European system of rights protec-
tion is currently grappling with the potentially dismembering fallout of
these tensions. However, in addition to considering the ways in which the
national legal system receives international law, we are, and should be,
attentive to how international legal systems deal with national law. That is
the focus of this chapter, in which I consider the reception of referendum-
emergent constitutional provisions3 in European consensus (EuC) deci-
sion making. In particular, I am interested in whether a referendum-
emergent constitutional provision that is at odds with a EuC ought to be
treated as sufﬁciently weighty to preserve a margin of appreciation for the
state and thus ‘save’ it from a violation of the Convention.
* Professor of Global Legal Studies, University of Birmingham. This chapter was written
before the referendum on repeal of the Eighth Amendment was announced in Ireland. On
25 May 2018, a majority voted to repeal Article 40.3.3 and replace it with the Thirty-Sixth
Amendment allowing for the regulation by law of termination of pregnancy.
1 Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41.
2 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (Appl. no. 14902/04), 20 September 2011.
3 By this, I mean constitutional provisions in domestic law, which were endorsed and
became part of the Constitution through a referendum.

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This is hardly a simple matter. As we will see later, constitutions are
often assumed to have a ‘specialness’ that is important to domestic
governments and often to polities. Constitutions are especially weighty
in domestic law, of course, but not so in international law, and it is perhaps
to be expected that this will sometimes cause friction between the two. But
when a constitutional provision has emerged from ‘the People’ through a
referendum, resolving that friction might be particularly difﬁcult. In such
a case, the constitutional provision is as close to a direct reﬂection of the
popular will as might be imagined in the context of a constitutional text.
If it conﬂicts with international human rights law, then that conﬂict is not
‘merely’ between two legal instruments, but between one legal instrument
concluded by states and one legal instrument that ﬂows directly from the
populace (at least to the extent that we might say any product of direct
democracy does so). On a doctrinal level, the legal conundrum remains
unchanged: a domestic law is in conﬂict with an international provision,
and this conﬂict is to be resolved in the ordinary way. However, the socio-
legal nature of the conﬂict is signiﬁcantly different.
The referendum-emergent constitutional provision has a particular
connection with the popular will and with popular sovereignty in the
domestic polity. In principle, the international system is based on the
consent of states, but in socio-political terms, states are collections of
people, and the will of the people is hardly irrelevant. This is intensiﬁed
in situations in which the domestic referendum-emergent constitutional
position has been alleged, but has not yet been determined, to be
incompatible with the international legal standard, that is, in cases in
which the claimant seeks an evolution of the rights standard to recognise
what she considers to be a violation. In such cases, how (if at all) should
the international adjudicator account for the fact that the domestic
provision emerges from a referendum? What weight, if any, should the
apparent popular will carry in the analysis? In short, how should an
international court decide?
This was precisely the challenge that faced the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) in A, B & C v. Ireland.4 This case, which is the
only one so far in which a referendum-emergent constitutional provision
was cast as a domestic consensus that trumped the EuC,5 involved
4 A, B & C v. Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 13.
5 I have previously termed this ‘trumping internal consensus’: F. de Londras and
K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, A, B and
C v Ireland’ (2013) 62(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 250.
   
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abortion and, more particularly, whether women in Ireland had a right to
access abortion in situations in which there was a risk to their health.
Irish constitutional law recognises the foetus as a rights-bearer and
restricts abortion to situations in which there is a real and substantial
risk to the life, rather than the health, of the pregnant person.6 In spite of
a EuC towards allowing abortion in a broader set of circumstances,
the Court allowed Ireland a continued margin of appreciation owing to
the ‘profound moral position’ of the Irish people said to be reﬂected
in the constitutional provision (Article 40.3.3), which emerged from
three referenda.
Taken in isolation from its socio-political context, A, B & C v. Ireland
is a singular case. EuC does not necessarily determine the outcome of a
dispute, but, here, we might reasonably have expected it to do so. There
are at least three reasons. First, as outlined later, the EuC was substantial
and weighty; it extended across the vast majority of the Council of
Europe (CoE) states (A and B could have accessed abortion in thirty
out of forty-seven Member States), and Ireland’s hyper-restrictive abor-
tion law was clearly out of step. Second, abortion relates to the intimate
sphere of personal decision making and privacy in respect of which
states ordinarily have a very limited margin of appreciation,7 meaning
that one would expect the EuC to have particularly persuasive force
where a state attempts to maintain a position that deviates from the
consensus in a manner that interferes with Article 8 rights. Third, the
argument that the Irish government made against the claim of a viola-
tion was one that was essentially grounded on a claim of the specialness,
not just of the constitutional provision, but of its referendum-emergent
nature in particular.
As we will see later, the Government argued that Article 40.3.3 of the
Irish Constitution reﬂects the profoundly held moral position of the Irish
populace on a matter of deep contention and, as a result, ought to be
considered determinative of the rights claim that was here being made
under the Convention. This is hardly the ﬁrst time that the Irish govern-
ment has made this claim; in essence, it was the argument also made
before the United Nations Human Rights Committee in recent cases
6 Article 40.3.3 Bunreacht na hÉireann; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013;
Attorney General v. X [1991] 1 IR 1. See generally F. de Londras and M. Enright, Repealing
the 8th: Reform of Irish Abortion Law (Bristol: Policy Press, 2018).
7 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 149.
       
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about the criminalisation of abortion in situations of fatal foetal abnor-
mality.8 The Human Rights Committee has refused to accept that a
state’s will, even if reﬂected in a constitutional referendum, could
determine questions of international human rights law or justify non-
compliance therewith, and found that the Irish law on abortion violated
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
including the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment.9 In contrast, the ECtHR in A, B & C found that the availability
of abortion was a matter for states to determine for themselves and was
one in relation to which there was a wide margin of appreciation, and
that the referendum-emergent nature of the Irish constitutional provi-
sion added particular weight to the claim that Irish law did not violate the
Convention.
The Court came to that conclusion, as I will show later, ﬁrst by
deploying EuC decision making, and then by consequently ﬁnding that
the legal regulation of abortion in Ireland is compatible with the Con-
vention, notwithstanding its deviation from the consensus. What the
Court did not do, in any clear sense, is determine whether and to what
extent abortion per se is properly a matter for analysis within the
Convention. Instead, it subtly constructed abortion as a matter of excep-
tional policy difﬁculty and exempted it from the ordinary implications of
a ﬁnding of EuC. It decided, in other words, not to decide on the key
question here, which was whether access to abortion is a human rights
matter under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and,
if so, how women’s right to access abortion can properly be protected
within the Convention framework. It achieved this by constructing the
referendum-emergent constitutional provision in Ireland as particular in
its ability to justify divergence from the EuC. In this, the Court continued
its unsatisfactory record of ‘fudging’ the question of abortion in its
jurisprudence, neither clearly determining whether the foetus is a
rights-bearer under the Convention nor whether women have Conven-
tion rights to access abortion,10 and engaging in a confounding manner
with EuC as a mode of decision making.
Its decision not to make a clear decision on the human rights implica-
tions of abortion, in spite of the existence of a EuC, raises serious
8 Mellet v. Ireland UNHRC Decision CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013, 9 June 2016.
9 Ibid.
10 On which, see generally D. Fenwick, ‘Abortion jurisprudence at Strasbourg: Deferential,
avoidant and normatively neutral?’ (2014) 34(2) Legal Studies 214.
   
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questions from the perspective of the Court’s legitimacy. If (as outlined in
Section 14.1) EuC is a mechanism of enhancing the legitimacy of the
Court, then the successful deployment of that technique is surely reliant
on some form of consistency and predictability. What A, B & C v. Ireland
illustrates, however, is that EuC is not always robustly deployed, but
rather can be sidestepped when the issue being considered raises particu-
lar policy difﬁculties for the Court. Rather than simply acknowledging
that abortion is a matter on which the Court did not want to decide, the
ECtHR instead seems to have corrupted the concept of EuC by allowing
the argumentatively logical conclusion of its application to be avoided
through what I will show is an inconsistent and illogical approach to
referendum-emergent constitutional provisions.
Having ﬁrst outlined the role of EuC in enhancing the legitimacy of
the ECtHR (Section 14.1), I consider the decision in A, B & C v. Ireland,
drawing particular attention to the Court’s contortions vis-à-vis the EuC
on access to abortion (Section 14.2). I argue that the Court’s conclusion
cannot be explained by either the specialness of constitutional provisions
per se or of referendum-emergent constitutional provisions in particular,
and is inconsistent with EuC decision making (Section 14.3). I conclude
that the motivation for the Court’s ﬁnding in A, B & C was a simple
reluctance to make a decision about the human rights implications of
laws that deny women agency in their reproductive lives, but that, in
deciding not to decide, the Court corrupted EuC as a mode of reasoning,
exposing its potential deployment in ways that lead to uncertainty and
inconsistency (Section 14.4).
14.1 European Consensus
Legitimacy is a complex notion in the law of the ECHR, as it is related to its
inputs, outputs, outcomes and societal perceptions.11 In the context of the
ECHR, there are multiple stakeholders, all of which have an interest in,
and a perception of, the legitimacy of the Court. Perhaps the most obvi-
ously important stakeholders are the contracting parties – on which the
system relies for its implementation and effectiveness – and the individ-
uals whose rights are protected by the Convention and who can engage
with the Court when their domestic legal systems have failed to adequately
protect and, when appropriate, remedy violations of their rights.
11 F. de Londras and K. Dzehtsiarou, Great Debates on the European Convention on Human
Rights (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), chapter 1.
       
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While, to some extent, both of these sets of stakeholders have a
common interest – the effective operation of the ECHR and the broader
CoE apparatus for its implementation and enforcement – they may have
a different understanding of what this means. For the contracting party,
it clearly means, among other things, respect for the principle of subsidi-
arity by the Court (which may be shorthand for respect for sover-
eignty);12 for the individual, it means recognising, respecting and
protecting her rights. The differences between these perspectives occa-
sionally become manifest, perhaps most often when an applicant asks the
Court to recognise her as bearing a right that has been violated in respect
of a previously unsettled issue, and the state asks the Court to ‘respect’ its
national position and to limit itself to what was clearly understood to be
protected by the Convention. Here, of course, is where much of the
tension relating to the evolution of the Convention is most evident,
and here too is where EuC decision making attempts to mitigate these
tensions.13
EuC decision making is one mechanism used by the Court to identify
whether and when to take a further step in the evolution of the Conven-
tion.14 If some, many or all of the Member States of the CoE already
consider that there is a right to X but the Convention law on this has not
been settled, then that consensus (established or emerging) can help the
Court to justify a ﬁnding that the right claimed is (a) protected by the
Convention and (b) has been breached by the respondent state.
Of course, the national laws of the contracting parties do not deter-
mine the meaning of the Convention. It is an autonomous body of law,
subject to autonomous interpretation.15 Thus, national laws simply act as
interpretive aides for the Court when applying a EuC approach to
assessing the reach of the Convention rights. The argument goes that
by reaching for those interpretative aides from the national deposits of
law, particularly within the CoE, the Court’s evolutive step might be
12 See, for example, Protocol 15 to the Convention, which adds a mention of subsidiarity to
the preamble of the ECHR.
13 See generally, K. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European
Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
14 For example, Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus; de Londras and Dzehtsiarou, Great
Debates, chapter 4; for a comprehensive and considered account of interpretation,
including EuC, see G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
15 On the autonomy of the Convention, see, in particular, Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation,
chapter 2.
   
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substantiated and supported in a way that tends to ensure that it can
maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the contracting parties.16 In this
way, EuC is effectively a persuasive mechanism and is not determinative
per se.
EuC is more than simply a means of persuading a contracting party to
accept the decision of the Court. It is also a mechanism of self-restraint
on the part of the Court itself inasmuch as its absence may alert the Court
to the possibility that an evolutive step desired by the applicant would
take it ‘too far too fast’ and potentially undermine its legitimacy in the
eyes of the contracting parties.17 EuC thus licences and restrains, per-
suades and substantiates. It is in these multiple ways that EuC might be
said to assist in maintaining the Court’s legitimacy.
Key to this legitimacy-enhancing nature of EuC is the Court’s failure to
discriminate between different kinds of law. When considering whether
there is a consensus in favour of a particular desired rights-related
outcome across the Member States of the CoE, the Court does not pay
undue attention to either the form of the law or the quality of the process
that led to it. A statutory instrument might be said to represent the
domestic legal position just as well as an act of parliament or a consti-
tutional provision. Of course, this is entirely understandable, particularly
if EuC is a process for enhancing legitimacy: it is not the job of the ECtHR
to determine the quality of the politico-legal process that led to a piece of
domestic law when sketching a picture of the European status quo for the
purposes of identifying a consensus.18 In that context, all that matters is
that the law is valid as a matter of domestic legal analysis; the ins and outs
of its making are a matter for the domestic system to address.
This suggests that when a EuC is identiﬁed that tends to support a
particular outcome before the Court, the existence of a contrary law in
the respondent state ought not to either determine the standard of rights
protection under the Convention or act as a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for
departing from that standard of protection. If it did, then EuC would be a
weak instrument indeed, both for the evolution of the Convention and
for the legitimation of the Court. With this as our starting point, let us
now turn to the curious events of A, B & C v. Ireland.
16 On this see generally Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus.
17 F. de Londras and K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Managing judicial innovation in the European Court
of Human Rights’ (2015) 15(3) Human Rights Law Review 523.
18 Although cf the use of procedural rationality when considering the compatibility of
domestic laws with the Convention per se.
       
Comp. by: M.SIVARAMAN Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 14 Title Name: KapotasAndTzevelekos
Date:3/10/18 Time:22:37:43 Page Number: 318
14.2 A, B & C v. Ireland
A, B & C concerns abortion law in Ireland. Long before Ireland regained
its independence, abortion was criminalised under the Offences against
the Person Act 1861.19 It remains criminalised today, albeit under a
much later statute: the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 2013.20
That later legislation was enacted as a direct result of A, B & C and
outlines how women can access the very limited constitutional right to
abortion in Ireland, which arises when the pregnant women’s life is
subject to a ‘real and substantial risk’ that can only be averted by bringing
the pregnancy to an end, when the foetus is not considered to be viable
and when the mechanism of terminating the pregnancy is thus abortion
(rather than an early delivery through C-section or the like).21 At the
time that the women who complained of a rights violation in A, B & C
had attempted to access abortion care, however, that 2013 Act did not
exist. Instead, Irish law was unclear, hyper-restrictive and extremely
unwieldy.22 It comprised several elements, which are relevant to the
outcome of the case.
The ﬁrst was the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which made it
a criminal offence, punishable by up to life in prison, to procure or
provide abortion care.23 The second was Article 40.3.3 of the Consti-
tution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.24 Article 40.3.3 provides
in full:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and
another state.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information
relating to services lawfully available in another state.
19 s. 58, Offences against the Person Act 1861.
20 s. 22, Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 2013.
21 X v. Attorney General [1992] 1 IR 1.
22 See the outline of the law as it stood in F. de Londras and L. Graham, ‘Impossible
ﬂoodgates and unworkable analogies in the Irish abortion debate’ (2013) 3(3) Irish
Journal of Legal Studies 54.
23 s. 53, Offences against the Person Act 1861.
24 Attorney General v. X [1991] 1 IR 1.
   
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The ﬁrst clause of this provision was introduced by referendum in 1983,
referendum being the only way to formally amend the Constitution of
Ireland. It is the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution and is
commonly referred to by that title. The provision was subjected to an
extremely restrictive interpretation by the Irish courts, so that its effect
was that it precluded anything that might in any way be said to endanger
foetal life by enabling access to abortion care, including the distribution
of information about abortion or contact information for abortion clinics
in the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland, where abortion
remains extremely restricted25).26 In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court
conﬁrmed that under Article 40.3.3, abortion was only available in
Ireland when the pregnant woman’s life was at ‘real and substantial risk’
(as had conventionally been understood) and that this risk included a
risk of death through suicide (which was not as originally thought).
That case – Attorney General v. X27 – exposed the detrimental impacts
of the Eighth Amendment. It concerned a fourteen-year-old girl who had
been raped and became pregnant, and who was suicidal. The Attorney
General had sought and acquired an injunction from the High Court to
prevent her parents from bringing her to the United Kingdom for an
abortion. The Supreme Court, on appeal, made it clear that she was
entitled to access abortion ‘at home’ in Ireland given the risk to her life;
however, the prospect that a child who had been the victim of a crime
could be enjoined from travelling for an abortion had struck a deep
chord with the Irish people.
The case was followed in 1992 by a further referendum, which intro-
duced the second and third clauses of Article 40.3.3 (on the rights to
travel and information). A proposal to conﬁrm that abortion could not
be accessed when the risk to life was a risk of suicide did not succeed.
A second attempt to reverse X by precluding abortion in cases of ‘suicidal
ideation’ was also unsuccessful in 2002.28 Thus, by the time that the
events underpinning A, B & C v. Ireland had taken place, the consti-
tutional position was that pregnant persons had a right to access abortion
25 The Abortion Act 1967 was never extended to Northern Ireland. In that jurisdiction, the
Offences against the Person Act 1861 remains in place and in force.
26 For a comprehensive outline and analysis of the judicial interpretation of Article 40.3.3,
see F. de Londras, ‘Constitutionalizing fetal rights: A salutary tale from Ireland’ (2015) 22
(2) Michigan Journal of Gender and the Law 243–89.
27 See footnote 7.
28 For an analysis and a comprehensive outline of the 1992 and 2002 referenda, see de
Londras, ‘Constitutionalizing fetal rights’, see footnote 26.
       
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when their life was at real and substantial risk, had a right to travel to
access abortion in any circumstances and had a right to information
relating to abortion. There was no legislative framework for determining
when and if someone fell into the category in which they were entitled to
access abortion, and medics faced the prospect of criminal charges and
potential life imprisonment under the Offences against the Person Act
1861 if they provided abortion care outside of those limited but
undeﬁned situations.
The third relevant legal provision was related to the availability of
information. As noted earlier, after the referendum in 1992, the Consti-
tution provided for ‘freedom to obtain or make available, in the State,
subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information
relating to services lawfully available in another state’ (my emphasis).
These conditions laid down by law were and remain extremely restrictive.
They are found in the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995, which provides that all
information regarding abortion must be non-directive and makes it a
criminal offence to make a referral for a patient for abortion services in
another state.
Ireland, then, had one of the most restrictive abortion law regimes in
the world when A, B and C all found themselves engaging with it. The
three cases were all rather different. A and B both claimed that the failure
to make abortion available in cases of a risk to health violated Article 8 of
the Convention. A had four children already, all of whom were in foster
care, she lived in poverty, was a recovering alcoholic, had suffered from
depression in all of her previous pregnancies and was in the process of
attempting to regain custody of her children, working with her social
worker. B had been informed by two doctors that there was a substantial
risk of ectopic pregnancy in her case, and she further did not want to
continue with the pregnancy as she did not feel she could cope with a
child on her own. Both A and B travelled to England for an abortion,
both experiencing difﬁculty with meeting the cost of the ﬂights and
abortion care. C claimed that the lack of legislation to determine whether
she was entitled to an abortion under the Constitution violated her
Article 8 rights. She had been receiving chemotherapy for three years
and, before her treatment, had been informed by her doctor that if she
were to become pregnant it would be dangerous for the foetus if she
continued treatment during the ﬁrst trimester. Having gone into remis-
sion, she unintentionally became pregnant, but claimed that she could
not access clear information about the impact of the pregnancy on her
   
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health owing to ‘the chilling effect of the Irish legal framework’.29 She
travelled to England, where she accessed abortion care.
While the ECtHR did ﬁnd a violation of C’s rights, holding that where
abortion is legally available, there must be a framework through which it
can be accessed30 (which is what the 2013 Act now provides31), it found
no violation in relation to A and B. The Government’s argument in these
cases was very much focused on the fact that the prohibition on abortion
in Ireland is constitutionally based, and thus, is ‘based on profound
moral values deeply embedded in the fabric of society in Ireland [. . .]
deﬁned through equally intense debate’.32 By asking the Court to ﬁnd
that the Convention required abortion to be made available in cases of a
risk to health, the government claimed that A and B were ‘asking the
Court to [. . .] go against the recognised importance and fundamental
role of the democratic process in each state and acceptance of a diversity
of traditions and values’ in the contracting parties.33
This was an especially important plank of the government’s argument,
which was that the constitutional status quo reﬂected the will of the
People. It argued that it was ‘entitled to adopt the view, endorsed by the
people, that the protection of pre-natal life [. . .] was a legitimate goal’34
and that ‘the opinion of the Irish people had been measured in referenda
in 1983, 1992, and 2002’.35 Given the lack, it was claimed, of any
European consensus on when life begins (as opposed to the availability
of abortion as a matter of law), the state’s ‘legitimate choice [. . .] that the
unborn was deserving of protection’ should be respected,36 particularly
since this related to ‘ethical and moral issues [. . .] to be distinguished
from scientiﬁc issues’.37 Even bearing in mind the EuC that might be said
to exist in respect of the availability of legal abortion, the government
claimed, this ‘consensus [. . .] was irrelevant since it was based on legisla-
tion and not on the decisions of any constitutional court on the
29 A, B & C v. Ireland, see footnote 5, para. 24.
30 In this, the Court reiterated its previous position in Tysiac v. Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42.
31 On the background to the introduction of the legislation, see C. O’Sullivan, J. Schweppe
and E. Spain, ‘Article 40.3.3 and the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013: The
impetus for, and process of, legislative change’ (2013) 3 Irish Journal of Legal Studies 1.
32 A, B & C v. Ireland, see footnote 5, para. 180.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, para. 182.
35 Ibid, para.183.
36 Ibid, para. 186.
37 Ibid, para. 188.
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provisions of a constitution’.38 Strangely, even if there were a relevant
consensus, the Irish government argued that Convention rights ‘were not
dependent upon the assessment of the popular will at any given time’39
and that ‘sometimes rights might have to be protected against the
popular will’.40
The arguments of the Irish government were, then, both that the fact
that the Irish legal position is enshrined in a Constitution is signiﬁcant
and that the fact that that position had emerged from referenda mattered.
In the context of a contentious and contested moral and ethical question,
constructed here as ‘when does life begin?’ (as opposed to ‘should women
have a right to access abortion care?’), Ireland’s argument was that any
existing consensus should be disregarded, even when such a consensus
would ordinarily point towards Convention protection for the rights of
the applicants.
The Court found that the prohibition on abortion in the cases of A and
B interfered with their rights under Article 8, but it proceeded to ﬁnd that
limitation to have been a justiﬁed interference based on what was
‘necessary in a democratic society’. The Court found that there was
insufﬁcient evidence to suggest that the constitutional status quo did
not reﬂect the will of the People, that there is no consensus on when life
begins and that the views of the Irish people reﬂected in the Constitution
‘were based on profound moral values concerning the nature of life
which were reﬂected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people
against abortion during the 1983 referendum and which have not been
demonstrated to have relevantly changed since then’.41
However, what about the consensus point? The Court held that, in
principle, the ‘acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues’42 arising in
relation to abortion is such that a wide margin of appreciation is relevant,
notwithstanding the fact that abortion is intimately connected with
personhood and privacy so that it should, in principle, be an issue in
relation to which states have a narrow margin of appreciation. The Court
was satisﬁed that there is a consensus ‘among a substantial majority’ of
the contracting parties towards a broader provision of abortion care and
noted that A and B could have accessed abortion in thirty out of the
38 Ibid, para.186.
39 Ibid, para. 187.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, para. 22.
42 Ibid, para. 233.
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forty-seven Member States of the CoE.43 However, because the Court
could not a ﬁnd a consensus on when life begins (as per Vo v. France44),
and because there had been a ‘lengthy, complex and sensitive debate in
Ireland [. . .] as regards the content of its abortion laws’45 which was
reﬂected in the referenda, the result of which was a prohibition ‘based
[. . .] on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of
life’,46 the EuC did not narrow the margin of appreciation conclusively.
In this case, then, referenda were important. The Court did not
endorse the view that a consensus cannot ‘override’ a constitutional
provision, argued in brief by the Irish government, but was inﬂuenced
by the fact that Article 40.3.3 emanated from referenda in two ways. First,
the fact that the provision was introduced following referenda was
extremely signiﬁcant in the Court’s vital ﬁnding that it reﬂected a
profound moral position held by the Irish people. Second, the Court
considered the fact that abortion had been discussed in and was perhaps
inﬂuential in the defeat of some other referenda (especially when it was
considered that the ratiﬁcation of changes to the EU treaties might have
had an impact on the regulation of abortion care in Ireland) as reinfor-
cing the apparent views of the people contained in the Constitution. The
Court, in other words, placed particular weight on the referendum-
emergent nature of the constitutional provision to override an existing
and substantial EuC that abortion should be available in cases such as
those presented by A and B. The implication here was that referendum-
emergent constitutional provisions are somehow ‘different’. It is to the
robustness of this suggestion that I now turn.
14.3 Are Referendum-Emergent Constitutional
Provisions Different?
As a matter of international law, constitutional provisions are no differ-
ent than other domestic legal provisions. If compliance with a judgment
of the ECtHR requires constitutional change, then the obligation to
execute the judgment exists without regard to the (frequently challen-
ging) nature of constitutional change when compared with legislative
43 Ibid, para. 235.
44 Appl. no. 53924/00, Eur Ct R., 8 July 2004.
45 Ibid, para. 239.
46 Ibid, para. 241.
       
Comp. by: M.SIVARAMAN Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 14 Title Name: KapotasAndTzevelekos
Date:3/10/18 Time:22:37:44 Page Number: 324
repeal or amendment.47 In international law, in many respects, consti-
tutions are just the same as any other form of domestic law. However, in
the context of EuC, domestic law is not usually pleaded in order to
attempt to justify non-compliance with an international obligation
(which it cannot do), but rather to make an argument about how that
international obligation ought to be understood. In that context, there are
at least some arguments that might suggest the super-weighting of
constitutional law compared with other forms of domestic law, so that
a constitutional provision contrary to the EuC might be able to ground a
margin of appreciation that would otherwise be narrowed, if not
absorbed, by the consensus.
In essence, all of these arguments can be boiled down to the claim that
the constitution is different from other forms of domestic law, that is, to
an argument of ‘constitutional exceptionalism’.48 Of course, that claim is
not unproblematic. The arguments outlined later take at face value a
number of assumptions, arguments and approaches to the nature of
constitutions and to what constitutions tell us about national identity
that can be subjected to a whole range of often compelling critical
disagreements, but might be taken ‘as is’ here for the purposes of the
argument to come.
The legal status of a constitution in domestic law is perhaps the most
obvious starting point. In most legal systems, the Constitution has a
particular status in domestic law: it binds all the actors including the
parliament and, where there is one, the monarch. It often, although not
always, sets absolute limits on what laws and policies can be introduced,
even empowering the courts to strike down legislation that is incompat-
ible with it. It is, to put it brieﬂy, the superior domestic law with which
all other laws must comply. Even in the United Kingdom, where the
ultimate constitutional principle might still be said to be parliamentary
sovereignty, legislation that is deemed ‘constitutional’ is increasingly
being recognised as entrenched, so that a particular and more challenging
process for amending it must be undertaken than is the case with
‘ordinary’ legislation.49 If the domestic legal system recognises the Con-
stitution as being particularly weighty or as having a very particular
normative force, why should the ECtHR not also recognise this, when
47 Article 46, ECHR.
48 C. Serkin and N. Tebbe, ‘Is the Constitution special?’ (2016) 101 Cornell Law Review 701.
49 Thoburn v. Sunderland CC [2002] 4 All ER 156; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary
of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
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determining either the content of a EuC or the persuasiveness of an
argument, grounded in domestic constitutional law, to justify divergence
from such a consensus?
In many ways, this comes down to why it is that constitutional
provisions are generally considered to be ‘special’. This is not, of course,
simply or merely a matter of the formal normative status within the
domestic hierarchy of laws. That hierarchy of laws in itself reﬂects
something more important and more fundamental: the sense that there
are some values, rules and provisions that are considered so important to
the state that they ought to enjoy superiority in order to preserve them.
This might be the protection of fundamental rights, the division of power
between regions and the central state, the articulation of a fundamental
national commitment or the articulation of the national identity in
constitutional terms – what is contained within that, and why, is very
much a product of each state’s individual constitutional tradition and
story of statehood. However, in each case, it reﬂects something telling
about the state itself: something thought to be so important to its consti-
tutional identity that it should be protected from simple or ‘merely’
political override, often reﬂected in the fact that constitutional provisions
are especially difﬁcult to amend or, at the very least, require a special
procedure for amendment. In some states, there are parts of the Consti-
tution that cannot be amended at all – that are fully entrenched – so
fundamental are they to the state’s constitutional identity and the
national politico-legal structure. In others, constitutions can only be
amended by super-majority vote or, in some cases, by two super-majority
votes: one preceding an election and the other following one. In yet more
states (such as Ireland), constitutional amendments can only be brought
about by a referendum.50
If it is the case that constitutions are ‘special’ because they reﬂect
something fundamental about the identity and nature of the state then
perhaps there is an argument that constitutional provisions per se ought
to be given particular weight by the ECtHR. If that is so then one would
argue that a state ought to be able to avoid a ﬁnding of non-compliance
with the Convention even when their law fails to reach a minimum
threshold of rights protection reﬂected in an established EuC. Instead,
the specialness of the constitutional provision would underpin a claim to
50 Article 46, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937. On amendability of constitutions generally see
R. Albert, X. Contiades and A. Fotiadou, The Foundations and Traditions of Consti-
tutional Amendment (Oxford: Hart Bloomsbury, 2017).
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exceptionalism from the European norm in a way that a mere legislative
provision would not. Legislation might (ideally) be said to reﬂect the will
of the People because of its production through a process of representa-
tive democracy, but it does not bear the specialness of a constitutional
provision. It is ‘mere’ law, rather than a reﬂection of a facet of the
constitutional identity and character of the state, and so it cannot be
expected to carry a similar normative force in the face of an established
EuC (which may itself, of course, reﬂect a mixture of constitutional and
legislative provisions from other states). It goes without saying that any
such argument undermines the normative force of the Convention and,
potentially, the normative force of the whole project of international
human rights law itself, but, taken on its own terms, there is nonetheless
something compelling about it.
Thus, there are at least some arguments for saying that constitutional
provisions should be treated differently in some way than other provi-
sions of domestic law. Indeed, taken together, they form a claim of
‘polythetic specialness’, that is, of a ‘combination of attributes [. . . that]
combine to legitimize special interpretive arguments in a way that no
feature can on its own’.51 If we assume that constitutions do have such a
specialness, then that might be said to attend to them even if they differ
across the CoE states in terms of their supremacy, entrenchment and so
on, and that this difference is signiﬁcant from the context of EuC decision
making. This, of course, is the material point here: we are testing not only
whether a constitutional provision ought to be considered weighty per se,
but whether that weightiness ought to be said to be such as to override a
EuC that exists across various legal instruments in other states. If so, a
state may be able to avoid an obligation to change its constitution in
order to be ECHR-compliant. That argument has never been accepted,
however. Indeed, no argument that domestic law reﬂects or embodies
deeply held national sentiment – about homosexuality52 or corporal
punishment53 or traditional values around family54 – has ever been
sufﬁcient to convince the ECtHR that a consensus to the contrary ought
not to be recognised in the articulation of a Convention-based standard
of rights protection. Instead, the EuC – where it has been sought and
51 Serkin and Tebbe, ‘Is the Constitution special?’, 770.
52 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 149; Norris v. Ireland (1989) 13
EHRR 186.
53 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 1.
54 Karner v. Austria (2003) 38 EHRR 528.
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found – has prevailed to ground an evolutive interpretation of the
Convention, and the respondent state has been required to execute
the \judgment, even when that meant constitutional change.55 The one
exception is A, B & C v. Ireland.
In reaching that decision, the Court was clearly inﬂuenced by the
referendum-emergent nature of the constitutional provision and seemed
to be particularly attracted to the argument that Article 40.3.3 was a
particular expression of the ‘will of the people’. It is not unusual for the
will of the people per se and the result of a referendum to be conﬂated,
especially when Ireland is defending its approach to the regulation of
abortion before international fora.56 Of course, this is an overly simplistic
claim in a number of important ways. First – and this is a rather obvious
but nonetheless important point – the deﬁnition of ‘the People’ is limited
by the rules relating to the franchise, as well as the practical impediments
to vote. The franchise and ‘the People’ are not aligned, in Ireland or
elsewhere, so that the rhetorical trope ought not to be allowed to be a
substitute for empirical fact. The second difﬁculty with this conﬂation is
that referenda allow for a determination of ‘the will of the People’ only
inasmuch as the system for a referendum provides for this. In Ireland,
there is no initiative process for a referendum; the holding, timing,
content and funding of a referendum is pursuant to the gift of the
government that commands a majority in the Oireachtas [Parliament].
It is the government that decides whether to hold a referendum and what
to hold it on.
The will of the People may well be for abortion to be available with no
restrictions whatsoever, without charge, to all pregnant persons who
want to avail themselves of it, but there would be no way to tell that
from the Constitution or, indeed, from the referenda that have already
been held. At the time of A, B & C v. Ireland there had never been a
55 See, for example, the constitutional amendments executed in Malta following Demicoli
v. Malta (1992) 14 EHRR 47.
56 It is the long-established practice of the Irish government to respond to criticism and
challenges to its abortion law in international fora by arguing that the Constitution
reﬂects the ‘will of the people’. See, for example, the arguments made to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee in Mellet v. Ireland UNHRC Decision CCPR/C/116/
D/2324/2013, 9 June 2016. Here, the arguments were unsuccessful, and Ireland was found
to be in breach of the ICCPR. For an outline and critique, see F. de Londras, ‘Fatal foetal
abnormality, the Irish Constitution, and Mellet v Ireland’ (2017) 24(4) Medical Law
Review 591.
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liberalizing referendum on abortion in Ireland.57 The 1983 referendum
constitutionalised foetal rights, and the 1992 and 2002 referenda
attempted to further restrict the already hyper-restrictive system by
ensuring that a suicidal woman could not access abortion unless some
other risk to her life could be identiﬁed. It is true that in 1992 the rights to
travel and access information were introduced, but these were not liber-
alising referenda per se; they had nothing to say about the popular will in
respect of access to abortion as a matter of Irish law. Instead, they
focused on enabling pregnant persons to access abortion ‘abroad’ should
they wish to do so.
On the only occasion the People were asked to express a view on the
substantive question of the content of abortion law in Ireland since 1983,
they were asked to further restrict it, and they refused. If one can infer
anything from that response – and it is not at all clear that one can – it is
hardly that the constitutional status quo reﬂects the will of the People,
but rather that it reﬂects something closer to the will of the People than
the alternative, more restrictive version that was offered on that day. It is
quite possible that this reading is no more feasible or convincing than the
Court’s, which, in turn, should caution against assuming that a referen-
dum represents the popular will in a manner that is any more profound
or accurate than the content of a piece of legislation. In truth, the only
thing the outcome of a referendum of this kind (where a speciﬁc consti-
tutional wording is proposed to the People) indicates is that, on the day
of the vote, that version of words was preferred (or not) over the
alternative that was put to the electorate. The same thing could most
likely be said about most constitutional referenda, so that placing any
special weight, in rights-related adjudication, on the referendum-
emergent nature of a provision can hardly be justiﬁed on this basis.
However, the Court appeared to place particular weight on the directly
democratic nature of the referendum, noting that ‘[f]rom the lengthy,
complex and sensitive debate in Ireland [. . .] as regards the content of its
abortion laws, a choice has emerged’:58 a choice that enjoys considerable
weight, notwithstanding its clear implications for the human rights of
pregnant people, mostly women, in Ireland. In many ways, this is
57 This did not happen until 2018, when Article 40.3.3 was repealed by majority vote and
before which this chapter was written. Once the referendum result is certiﬁed (when all
legal challenges have been completed), the Irish parliament will consider and pass a new
law allowing for the availability of lawful abortion in certain circumstances.
58 para. 239.
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curious; after all, the Court ﬁnds laws that have been passed following
lengthy, complex and sensitive debates to violate the Convention all the
time, notwithstanding the growing importance of procedural rationality
in its decision making.59 There is no reason in principle why referendum-
emergent constitutional provisions ought to be saved that fate, even when
they are being impugned in a context, as here, in which an evolutive
interpretation of the Convention is sought. Although referenda are an
exercise in direct democracy, their democratic character cannot be said to
be necessarily superior to those laws that are passed by a legislative body
as an exercise in representative democracy. I have already shown that
referenda might well be just as refracted an expression of the popular will
as legislation, as the populace is being asked simply to express a view on
an autonomously generated proposition rather than to express ‘freehand’
their particular policy preference. Even in situations in which popular
initiative can lead to a referendum, there is a process of refraction and
rationalisation of the popular will at play that is analogous to that which
takes place in the normal legislative process.
The fact that a legislative provision can be found to violate the
Convention means that in principle international human rights law
rejects the proposition that majoritarianism ought to determine rights.
The same principle can be applied to referendum-emergent constitu-
tional provisions. The democratic process may be ‘direct’ (subject to the
earlier observations), but the capacity of international human rights law
to protect against majoritarianism still ought to be harnessed in such
cases. Indeed, one might argue that this is in many ways the essence of
rights in the liberal democratic tradition. This makes it all the more
remarkable for the Court in A, B & C to have pointed to a referendum-
emergent constitutional provision in order to determine the core ques-
tion of whether or not the Convention protects the right of pregnant
persons to access abortion care.
Of course, one might argue that the evolution of the Convention
standards by reference to EuC is itself a form of majoritarianism in rights
protection. The distinction, however, is clear. EuC decision making is a
technique that underpins the (primarily) evolutive interpretation of the
Convention to protect rights. It is not determinative but rather aids the
Court in its development of the Convention. It also requires neither a
majority per se nor a literal consensus among the Member States, but
59 See, for example, P. Popelier and C. van de Heyning, ‘Subsidiarity post-Brighton:
Procedural rationality as answer?’ (2017) 30(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 5.
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rather is used to identify a trend that, in turn, is applied to develop the
Convention. Certainly, there will be times when the lack of a EuC might
mean that the Court cannot be convinced that a desired evolutive leap
ought to be undertaken, but that is clearly distinguishable from the
outcome in A, B & C, which was to the effect that the decision of a
majority of those who voted in a domestic constitutional referendum to
actively deny women the right to access abortion care could determine
the extent of the Irish state’s obligations under the ECHR. This outcome
is not consistent with the Court’s general approach to either EuC or the
protection of rights that relate to intimate personal decisions.
14.4 A, B & C, Referenda and Deciding Not to Decide
The Irish government has repeatedly argued in Strasbourg and elsewhere
that the Constitution reﬂects the deeply held and profound moral pos-
ition of the Irish people when it comes to abortion and that this is
determinative of its obligation under international human rights law.60
There is no other issue on which such an argument would get as much as
a moment’s positive attention in an international human rights forum. In
making this argument, successive Irish governments have tried to export
their own abdication of responsibility for the rights of pregnant persons
to international tribunals. In Ireland, the political response to calls for
abortion liberalisation has long been a metaphorical shrug that the
Constitution limits what can be done, that it reﬂects the will of the
People and that if that results in harm to pregnant people – involuntary
detention to continue pregnancy,61 forced hydration when a woman goes
60 This has largely been unsuccessful. As well as the decision in Mellet v. Ireland (see
footnote 48), see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Ireland, E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, 8 July 2015,
para. 30; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding
Comments: Ireland, CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/4–5, 22 July 2005, paras 38–39; Committee on
the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth
Period Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3–4, 1 March 2016, paras 57–58; Committee
against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Ireland,
CAT/C/IRL/CO/1, 17 June 2011, para. 26.
61 This was the reported experience of a teenage girl who was considered not to be
sufﬁciently suicidal to access an abortion under the Protection of Life during Pregnancy
Act 2013 but who was subjected to involuntary detention under the Mental Health Act.
She was subsequently released from detention pursuant to court order, the court ﬁnding
that while she was distressed, she did not have a mental illness that required or justiﬁed
the deprivation of liberty.
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on a hunger strike in protest of her inability to access abortion,62 mental
anguish at having to effectively smuggle a foetus with a fatal foetal
abnormality ‘home’ for a funeral following a late-term abortion in Liver-
pool,63 death from untreated septicaemia because no intervention would
be provided until the pregnant woman was on the cusp of death64 – then
so be it.
Until the 2018 referendum on repeal of the Eighth Amendment,
abortion was unquestionably the most contentious issue in the Irish
political discourse. It is also clear that political opinion was signiﬁcantly
behind popular opinion, inasmuch as it could be gleaned from opinion
polling and deliberative processes.65 Those same politicians controlled
the timing, nature, wording and occurrence of referenda. This was a
circle that could not be squared. What is especially confounding about
the decision of the ECtHR is that by allowing a referendum-emergent
constitutional provision to override EuC, the Court failed to account for
the decades-long political failure to assert and protect the rights of
women in Ireland.
In the world of international human rights law, acknowledging that a
lack of reproductive autonomy has rights-related implications is hardly
contentious.66 One can reach this conclusion without determining
whether there is a ‘right to abortion’ per se. It is thus very clear that
62 This was the experience of ‘Ms Y’, on which, see M. Enright and F. de Londras, ‘Empty
without and empty within: The unworkability of the Eighth Amendment after Savita
Halappanavar and Miss Y’ (2014) 20(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 85.
63 This is a widely reported experience whereby people access abortion care at the Liverpool
Women’s Hospital, one of the few places in the United Kingdom that can offer such care
to pregnant persons from Ireland who receive a late-term diagnosis of fatal foetal
abnormality, as a result of which they decide to bring the pregnancy to an end. In these
cases, the abortion usually comprises foeticide followed by the delivery of a stillborn baby,
which many people choose to bring ‘home’ for a burial. Doing so often requires them to
hide the corpse in a car and take the ferry back to Ireland.
64 This was the experience of Savita Halappanavar, on which see Enright and de Londras,
‘Empty without and empty within’.
65 For example, the Citizens Assembly (established as a deliberate forum for the discussion
of inter alia the future of Irish abortion law) recommended an extremely liberal abortion
law regime, which was followed by reports that many politicians considered that their
primary task was to ‘water down’ those recommendations. See Citizens Assembly, Final
Report on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (2017). Available at
www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-
on-the-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-incl-Appendix-A-D.pdf.
66 See, for example, UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health’ (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4; Report of the Special
Rapporteur on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment (2016) A/HRC/
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reproductive autonomy, including access to abortion, is an area of pro-
found human rights concern: one about which we might expect a human
rights court to adjudicate, especially when domestic law utterly fails to
accommodate the rights of women in its legal regulation of reproductive
healthcare. However, the approach taken in A, B & C v. Ireland was such
that these clear and unquestionable rights implications of hyper-
restrictive abortion law regimes are to be left to the domestic sphere.
Unlike other ﬁelds of governance, the Convention had nothing mean-
ingful to say about abortion. The regulation and availability of abortion
was, quite simply, for the national polity to decide.
Although in A, B & C, the Court tied that conclusion to the
referendum-emergent nature of the Irish constitutional provision that
underpins the legal prohibition on abortion in that jurisdiction, it was in
reality simply continuing its pattern of treating abortion as a matter of
procedure rather than of substantive rights,67 and of allowing the lack of
a consensus on the moral or legal status of the foetus68 to determine the
question of the protection of the rights of women, whose moral and legal
status as rights-bearers is utterly uncontested. To do so in the face of a
clear and persuasive EuC in favour of access to abortion, in at least some
situations, beyond a risk to the life of the pregnant woman, is both
inconsistent with EuC as an instrument that both licences (to evolve)
and restrains (from evolving), and involves the illogical exceptionalisa-
tion of referendum-emergent constitutional provisions in a manner that
does not withstand serious scrutiny.
Conclusion
It is perhaps easy to treat A, B & C v. Ireland as an idiosyncratic case
within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The topic in question (abortion) is
one in respect of which there is no moral or ethical consensus, even if
there is a legal consensus across the CoE Member States. Furthermore,
the Irish context raised a particular challenge for the Court precisely
because the constitutional prohibition on abortion was referendum
emergent and, thus, posed a particularly striking contrast to a collection
of judges sitting in Strasbourg, applying an international treaty, and with
31/57; UN CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention
(Women and Health)’ (1999) UN Doc A/54/38/Rev.1
67 See Tysiac v. Poland, see footnote 30.
68 Vo v. France (2005) 40 EHRR 12.
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limited democratic or other connection to the polity that had approved
that constitutional provision.
However, although the case of A, B & C v. Ireland does have some
particular features, it nevertheless illustrates well the conundrums that
arise when we consider the relationship between EuC and referendum-
emergent constitutional provisions in domestic law. What would the
implications be for the Court if it were to reach a conclusion that such
a provision does violate the Convention, thus creating a serious execution
quandary for the respondent state that must rely on those same voters to
make good the incompatibility through a further referendum? And what
if they decide not to; if they conclude that their decision on the protection
of rights should not be overridden by that of seventeen judges in Stras-
bourg, who were in turn informed in their conclusions by the views of
legislatures and electorates in other states through the application of a
EuC approach? And what of the question of determining EuC itself:
should legal provisions that were introduced by referendum carry more
weight in the ‘consensus calculus’ or ought there to be a simple approach
through which the Court refuses to attend to the provenance of a
domestic legal rule in determining consensus?
Neither A, B & C v. Ireland nor this chapter offers answers to those
questions, but what both do is to point to the importance of arriving at
these answers in order to avoid the charge that, rather than guide the
Court in its difﬁcult and delicate task of evolving the Convention, EuC is
in fact a mechanism of avoiding making decisions on difﬁcult questions
and deferring to the ‘will of the People’ in domestic states, whether that is
directly expressed through referendum or obliquely through primary
legislation.
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